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Abstract 
This paper examines whether women benefit from working under female management 
using Swedish matched employer-employee panel data. I account for unobserved 
heterogeneity among both workers and firms potentially correlated with manager 
gender. The results show a substantial negative and statistically significant correlation 
between the proportion of female managers and the establishment’s gender wage gap. 
However, estimates that account for sorting on unobserved worker skills do not support 
that that managers favor same-sex workers in wage setting. Additional results show 
female-led organizations recruit more non-managerial, high-wage women but this is 
primarily due to (unobserved) firm attributes rather than gender-specific management 
practices. 
Keywords: Gender wage gap, managers, worker sorting 
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2  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap 1 Introduction 
The underrepresentation of women in certain occupations and managerial positions is 
often cited as an indicator for the persistent gender labor market disparities observed in 
many countries. To improve women’s’ outcomes in the labor market, several countries 
have recently taken action to encourage gender parity in top positions, for example, by 
imposing mandated gender quotas at the highest levels of public and private 
organizations.
1  
The aim of this paper is to examine whether increasing female representation among 
managers can lower the gender wage gap. Despite a substantial amount of theoretical 
work on why female representation among managers could be important, there is very 
little empirical evidence quantifying the effects of the manager’s gender on the 
outcomes of their female employees. 
The gender differences in labor market outcomes are still substantial throughout the 
industrial world (Polachek and Xiang, 2009). Findings suggest that occupational sorting 
accounts for around half of the estimated male-female wage gap and that there is a 
“glass ceiling” preventing women from moving up the career ladder (Albrecht et al., 
2003, Arulampalam et al., 2005, Bayard et al., 2003). An increased share of women in 
decision-making positions may both directly help close the gender wage gap and also 
narrow the wage differences between male and female sub-ordinates through multiple 
indirect channels. Relative to males, female managers may for example have better 
information about women’s productivity and/or stronger social ties to other women. 
They may moreover, reduce discriminatory behavior, increase womens’ human capital 
through mentoring, or serve as important role models for lower-level female employees 
(Becker, 1971, Athey et al., 2000, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Previous empirical research on the importance of the manager’s gender on employee 
wages has mainly used cross-sectional data. Hence, they generally suffer from the 
difficulty in separating the influence of female managers from other factors that could 
generate gender differences in pay, such as unobserved differences in worker 
                                                 
1 Norway was the first country to adopt mandated gender quotas in corporate boards in 2003. The law required at 
least 40 percent of the directors of public firms to be women in 2005. A similar law came in effect in France in 2010. 
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2 A few more recent studies have attempted to address 
this potential identification problem using longitudinal data. In particular, Bell (2005) 
and Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010) use establishment fixed effects models to reduce 
bias from static unobserved establishment characteristics that are correlated with 
manager gender. Their approach is however limited by the fact that they are unable to 
control for productivity-related changes among the employed and thus separate between 
potential explanations for gender differences in pay. 
Because the employment relationship is influenced by the choice of both workers 
and employers, such compositional effects are potentially important. As decision-
makers of the firms, managers may not only directly affect the wages of the current 
workers but also affect the identity of the workers selected into employment (Bandiera 
et. al., 2009). Female managers may, for example recruit higher quality, non-managerial 
female workers because they have better information about other women’s productivity. 
The most qualified female workers may also enter female-led firms due to self-
selection, for example, if career-oriented women anticipate better opportunities in 
female-led firms. In any case, manager changes could be correlated with simultaneous 
changes in workforce composition, which in turn may lead to a positive correlation 
between women-led firms and female wages.
3  
The key contribution of this paper is that I am able to control for time invariant 
sources of heterogeneity across workers, such as their ability, when investigating the 
role of female managers for employee wages. In addition, the paper provides new 
insights to the potential mechanisms at work, specifically by examining the relationship 
between female managers and the gender- and skill composition of new hires and how 
the wage effects of having female managers vary over the employment spell. 
The analysis uses administrative longitudinal matched employee-employee data from 
Sweden. The data contain high-quality wage measures and detailed occupational data 
                                                 
2 Laboratory experiments, for example, suggest that women are more risk-averse and less willingness to compete and 
seek challenges compared to men (see Bertrand, 2011, for a summary of these findings). Bertrand et al (2010) 
empirically demonstrate that high-skilled women sort into family-friendly work environment with shorter and more 
flexible hours. Due to compensating differentials, these environments may also pay less on average.  
3 The only paper that I am aware of that accounts for worker heterogeneity when analyzing the role of managers is 
Bandiera et al. (2009) study how social connections between managers and employees affect productivity in a British 
fruit-picking company. However, they focus on similarity with respect to nationality and not gender per se. 
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and account for an individual’s experience and job tenure. Importantly, I can also 
account for several observable establishment characteristics as well as establishment 
fixed effects to capture workplace attributes that could influence both the gender 
composition of managers and the gender wage gap, even in the absence of a causal rela-
tionship between the two.  
Descriptive analysis suggests that the gender wage gap within non-managerial 
occupations decreased by one percentage point between 1996 and 2008. During the 
same period, the proportion of female managers increased by more than 10 percentage 
points. Despite this increase, women remain under-represented among managers, in 
particular among executives, and on high-paying positions in the private sector.   
A more formal analysis of the association between a higher share of female managers 
and the gender wage gap shows that female workers receive 1.4 percent higher wages in 
women-led compared to male-led establishments. Male workers, in contrast, receive 3.6 
percent lower wages, giving a 5 percent narrowing of the total gender wage gap in 
women-led firms. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry, occupation and 
establishment fixed effects, hence sorting of men and women into different jobs cannot 
explain the relationship.  
However, most of the association goes away when accounting for worker fixed 
effects, suggesting that sorting on unobserved skills, such as unobserved human capital 
or effort, is an important determinant of the establishment gender wage gap. The result 
indicates that the relationship between female managers and the gender wage gap 
primarily goes through the selection of employees into male and female led organi-
zations. To shed further insights to this conjecture, I examine how female managers 
affect the composition of new hires. More specifically, I use pre-determined measures 
of worker skills derived using the estimation methods developed by Abowd et al. (1999) 
and relate the skill composition of hires to the gender composition of managers. The 
analysis suggests that female-led establishments hire women with higher (unobserved) 
portable earnings capacity, although this is primarily due to unobserved firm practices 
rather than manager gender per se. 
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diminishes with tenure and wage growth is higher for women who themselves are in 
minority but who are supervised by female, compared to male, middle managers. 
Nonetheless, the overall results suggest that skill sorting is more important than differ-
ential treatment of equally productive workers in explaining the correlation between 
female managers and the gender wage gap. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the 
literature on gender management and wages; Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 first 
provides a descriptive analysis of gender wage differences and women-led establish-
ments in Sweden, followed by a more formal analysis of the association between female 
managers and the gender wage gap. Section 5 investigates the impact of female 
managers on the composition of hires and Section 6 concludes. 
2  Background and related literature 
There are several potential mechanisms that explain why female-led firms may have 
systematically narrower gender wage gaps than firms led by men. First, theoretical 
models suggest that both taste-based and statistical discrimination can give rise to lower 
female wages in male-led firms (Becker, 1971; Lazear and Rosen, 1990). If male 
managers have less precise information about women’s productivity or systematically 
assign women to less favorable positions, the gender wage gap is expected to narrow 
when the share of female managers increase.
4  
Second, women may obtain more (or better) mentoring by female managers, either 
because they find it easier to establish mentoring relationships with other women or 
because they receive better mentoring from more similar supervisors (Athey et al., 
                                                 
4 Men and women who do the same job for the same employer receive similar wages in Sweden, in other 
Scandinavian countries as well as in the US. Differential treatment of men and women doing equal work for the same 
employer is thus likely to be of second order (Meyersson Milgrom et al., 2001). Still, gender-related differences in 
job assignment and promotions could be important factors for the observed gender wage gap. The empirical literature 
offers mixed evidence on gender differences in promotions. Some studies find that women have lower promotion 
rates than observably identical males (c.f. Olson and Becker, 1983; Blau and DeVaro, 2007, Cobb-Clark, 2001, 
Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005), while others find no relationship or a reversed relationship between gender and 
promotions (Barnett et al., 2000). Studying the Austrian labor market, Weber and Zulehner (2010, 2011) find that 
firms with a higher fraction of women upon firm entry have higher survival rates, which is consistent with a model of 
discriminatory employers being driven out of the labor market.  
6  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap 2000). Empirical studies have to a large extent focused on mentoring relationships in 
academia. Neumark and Gardecki (1998) and Hilmer and Hilmer (2007) find no 
evidence of positive effects from gender similarity between economics PhD students 
and their advisors. However, in a recent evaluation of a randomized trial of a mentoring 
program for female economists, Blau et al. (2010) demonstrate an increased number of 
publications and successful grants among women who received mentoring relative to 
those who did not.
5 
More recently, a growing literature has emphasized the role of social networks for 
gender-driven labor market outcomes. Social connections with the manager could affect 
employment and wages because networks disseminate information about jobs and job 
candidates and may also affect how workers are assigned to jobs and ranks within the 
workplace. When the representation of female managers increase partially segregated 
networks could thus help women by pulling them into better jobs than they otherwise 
would have obtained in a comparable male-led firm (Bell, 2005).
6  
Laboratory experiments and observational studies also point toward the importance 
of gender differences in preferences and attitudes related to, for example, 
competitiveness and the willingness to negotiate (Bertrand, 2011,  provides an 
overview).
7 Consistent with this literature Säve-Söderberg (2009) finds that women 
submit systematically lower wage bids than men and are also offered lower wages in 
Sweden. Even if this and similar studies do not explicitly consider how negotiations 
vary with the gender of the negotiating parties, a higher share of female managers could 
potentially help neutralize the gender differences in negotiation, if negotiations between 
similar parties are more efficient (Kolb and McGinn, 2008). 
The literature also discusses the role of gender-related norms and social status 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Goldin, 2002). An increasing number of women who break 
traditional gender roles on the labor market can encourage other women to invest in 
                                                 
5 Bettinger et al., (2005) look at college faculty composition in Ohio and find that female faculty enhanced the 
outcomes for female students, which supports a possible role model effect. 
6 Several studies have found that a large percentage of jobs are found through social contacts. In summary, these 
surveys find that between one-third and two-thirds of workers find their jobs through friends, relatives, and other 
social contacts. See Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) for an overview of this literature. Bandiera et al., (2009) 
show that workers that have social connections to the manager are assigned to better jobs. 
7 Sweden moved to a more decentralized wage bargaining system in the 1980s with greater scope for individual wage 
variation. Thus, mechanisms of this kind may have become more important (Nordström Skans et al., 2009).  
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managers, this could explain why employers hire and promote same-sex employees.  
Others have at the same time highlighted that persistent gender-related norms may 
cause traditionally “male” managerial behaviors to persist even in the event of a 
management change (Ely, 1995, Graves and Powell, 1995). A similar argument is that 
female managers may be appointed as “gate-keepers” with the intention to maintain the 
majority’s dominance.
8  
Despite the many plausible reasons for why women could benefit from having 
female managers, only a few studies have looked at the empirical relevance of these 
arguments. Most of this evidence is based on cross-sectional studies relating the gender 
wage gap to the representation of managers (Hultin and Szulkin, 2003, Cohen and 
Huffman, 2007). While these provide suggestive evidence of the importance of 
managers, it should be noted that they suffer from potential problems generated by 
omitted variables.  
Two recent studies use more reliable identification strategies relying on establish-
ment panel data to establish a relationship between manager characteristics and 
individual outcomes. Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010) study a large representative 
sample from Portugal and find that female wages are higher when female management 
increase within establishments. In addition, Bell (2005) shows that female executives in 
women-led firms have higher compensation and are more likely to be among the top-
five paid executives than comparable women in male-led firms. 
These studies are compelling because they deal with some of the potential differ-
ences between male-led and female-led firms that could bias the coefficients of interest. 
However, they are also limited in the sense that they do not account for the potentially 
endogenous selection of workers into male- and female-led firms.
9 
                                                 
8 Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) exploit random assignment of candidates to evaluation committees in public 
examinations in Spain and show that female candidates are less likely to be hired when the committee consists of a 
greater share of women. They attribute this finding to that female evaluators are either overestimating the true quality 
of male candidates or that the presence of women strengthens the male committee members’ bias towards male 
candidates. 
9 A related literature documents substantial amounts of occupational and establishment gender segregation and that 
female-dense firms pay lower wages and have higher gender wage gaps (Carrington and Troske, 1995, Bayard et al., 
2003, Datta Gupta and Rothstein, 2005). A few recent studies also looks at racial (Giuliano et al., 2009 and Giuliano 
and Ransom, 2010) and immigrant (Aslund et al., 2009) bias in hirings and quits. 
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The data used for this analysis come from administrative registers collected by Statistics 
Sweden. The main register, Strukturlönestatistiken, contains annual information on 
detailed occupational characteristics and monthly full-time wages for all establishments 
in the public sector and for a large sample of establishments in the private sector. 
Individuals are included in the annual dataset conditional on being employed in the 
month of November. The sample is stratified by firm size and industry and small 
establishments are thus underrepresented. Altogether, the data cover around 50 percent 
of those employed in the private sector with sampling weights to make the results 
representative for the population. The sample contains about 1.7 million workers per 
year for 13 years and 60,000 unique establishments, each observed for an average of 5 
years.  
Managers are identified according to the Swedish Standard for Classification of 
Occupations (SSYK), which is based on international standards (ISCO-88). The first 
digit in the occupational code divides the data into ten broad occupational levels with a 
specific number for managerial positions. It is also possible to identify more detailed 
manager types using the 3-digit code, such as top managers (directors and chief 
executives as well as managers for small enterprises) and middle managers (production 
and operation managers and other specialist managers in marketing, sales, human 
resources, and so on).  
The main analysis focuses on the impact of women among the establishment’s 
highest ranked managers on the wages of non-managerial workers. This means that I 
consider the share of women in top management for establishments that have top 
managers (72 percent of the sampled establishments) and the share of female middle 
managers, otherwise. For firms with multiple managerial levels, I also examine the 
effects of the proportion of women in top and middle management, as managers at 
lower tiers may provide stronger mentoring relationships or role models.  
The main analysis focuses on the period 1996-2008. The wage data is further linked 
to information on individual characteristics such as age, gender and education as well as 
annual earnings. This information is available for the entire working-age population, 
and it stretches back to 1985. I use this data to derive measures of individual work 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  9 experience and job tenure (truncated at 1985). In addition, I also calculate the annual 
proportion of female entry level co-workers (excluding managers) for each establish-
ment in the sample. 
In addition, I exploit auxiliary data from 1985-1995 to construct individual skill 
measures for the analysis of worker sorting. The data and estimation procedure for this 
analysis are described in more detail in Section 5.2. 
4  Female managers and the gender wage gap  
4.1  Descriptive evidence from Sweden 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report statistics for the weighted sample, broken down by 
gender. These display well-known patterns documented in earlier studies for several 
countries; despite small gender differences in age, education and experience, women 
have more female co-workers, work in larger establishments and more often in the 
public sector. The occupational distribution also varies between men and women; more 
women work as clerks and service workers, whereas males are more likely to be craft 
workers and machine operators. One number that stands out is the low representation of 
women in management occupations; three percent of female employees have 
managerial jobs compared to nine percent of males.  
Table 2 describes the characteristics of male and female managers. On average, 
female managers are younger and have higher education levels compared to male 
managers, which may reflect that the smaller group of female managers is more selected 
relative to the males. Yet, the wages received by female managers are slightly lower on 




                                                 
10 Other Scandinavian countries display similar wage gaps and high levels of occupational segregation (Datta Gupta 
et al., 2006). Meyersson-Milgrom and Petersen (2006) provide evidence on trends in female management from 
Sweden and the US. 
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Share of female co-workers  0.67 0.31  0.77  0.53 
Age  42.1 40.1  42.6  41.7 
Experience  14.8 14.7  15.0  14.6 
Tenure  6.8 7.2  6.6  7.4 
Education level:       
Less or equal than primary school  0.13 0.17  0.10  0.15 
2 years of high school  0.31 0.30  0.31  0.28 
3 years of high school  0.18 0.21  0.16  0.20 
Some college  0.17 0.14  0.17  0.15 
At least 3 years of college  0.21 0.16  0.26  0.20 
Graduate  0.01 0.02  0.01  0.01 
Unknown  0.002 0.003  0.002  0.002 
Occupation:        
Legislators, senior officials and managers  0.03 0.09  -  - 
Professionals  0.19 0.17  0.24  0.21 
Technicians and associate professionals  0.21 0.19  0.19  0.23 
Clerks  0.15 0.06  0.10  0.23 
Service workers and shop sales workers  0.30 0.07  0.38  0.14 
Craft and related trade workers  0.01 0.18  0.01  0.02 
Plant and machine operators and  
assemblers 
0.04 0.19  0.01  0.09 
Elementary occupations  0.07 0.05  0.07  0.07 
Establishment characteristics:        
Age of establishment  14.6 14.2  14.3  15.2 
Private Sector  0.35 0.62  0.28  0.51 
Establishment size  441 364  299  693 
Observations   13,496,367 10,149,707  4,991,116  4,800,542 
Years  13 13  13  13 
Notes: Establishments are counted as female-led if more than 50 percent of the highest ranked managers are women. 
The variables for experience, tenure and age of establishment are calculated from the data and truncated in 1985. The 
observations are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. 
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Age  45.4 46.3 
Experience  17.3 17.2 
Education level:    
Less or equal than primary  0.06 0.11 
2 years of high school  0.15 0.20 
3 years of high school  0.14 0.20 
Some college  0.28 0.20 
At least 3 years of college  0.36 0.27 
Graduate  0.01 0.02 
Unknown  - - 
Manager type:    
Share of managers in top management  0.31 0.38 
Share of managers in middle management  0.69 0.62 
Observations  347,907 606,578 
Years  13 13 
Notes: The sample consists of all of the highest ranked managers within each establishment. The observations are 
weighted according to their sampling probabilities. 
The analysis examines the impact of manager sex composition on wages received by 
non-managerial workers. Figure 1 displays the male-female wage gap for these workers 
in the period 1996-2008, based on yearly wage regressions that account for standard 
human capital variables (age, age
2, education level and experience) and 3-digit 
occupation. Figure 2 shows the share of female managers over the same period. 
In line with previous literature, differences in the occupational distribution explain 
about half of the gender wage gap adjusted for standard human capital controls. We can 
also see that the within-occupation gender wage gap narrowed by 1.5 percentage point 
during this period at the same time as the proportion of female managers experienced a 




                                                 
11 The gender wage gap narrowed dramatically from the 1960’s to the early 1980’s. An increased wage compression 
was partly responsible for this, although changes in other factors, such as unobserved skills and discrimination, seem 
to have been more important (Edin and Richardsson, 2002). The closing of the gender gap slowed down and even 
increased somewhat during the 1980s.  
12 The number of female managers is steadily increasing throughout the study period. Hence the “jump” in the female 
management share in the beginning and end of the period is attributable to changes in the number of male-led firms, 
which display more variation over this period. The variation is consistent with the growth of the Swedish economy, 
which continued to increase since the recession in the early 1990s but slowed down between 2007 and 2008.  
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Figure 2 Share of female (highest ranked) managers 1996-2008 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 provide descriptive evidence on female non-managerial 
workers in female-led versus male-led establishments, which are defined as female-led 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  13 if more than half of the highest ranked managers are women.
13 Compared to male 
managers, women disproportionally manage other women in smaller establishments in 
the public sector; only 28 percent of female-led women work in the private sector 
compared to 51 percent of male-led women.  
In sum, this descriptive analysis suggests that the share of female managers has 
increased substantially during the study period and that the gender wage gap has 
narrowed. However, women are still found in lower-ranked managerial positions 
relative to males, and they manage a substantially higher share of women. There is 
moreover a negative correlation between the proportion of female managers and 
women’s wages, which seems partly due to the high concentration of female managers 
in the public sector and in lower-paying jobs. The next step is to try to assess whether 
the increased share of women in management is associated with reductions in the male-
female wage gap. 
5 Results 
5.1  Female managers and wages 
To examine whether the gender composition of managers affects the gender wage gap I 
estimate models of the following form: 
 
11 2 log( )
MM
ijt i i ijt ijt ijt jt i t ijt wF F S S X W β γγ δ δ =+ × + + + + + + ε
                                                
 (1) 
 
where log(w)ijt is the log monthly wage of worker i in establishment j in year t;   is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the worker is female;   is the proportion of 




ijt X jt W
 
13 Figure A 1 displays the distribution of female managers and co-workers for men and women in the sample. It 
confirms that women have higher exposure to both female co-workers and female managers. We also see that most 
workers have either zero or all female managers, which reflect that most establishments have one manager at the 
highest rank. 
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14 Finally,   and   denote year and worker fixed effects, respectively, 
and   is the error term. The main coefficient of interest is  , which measures the 
impact of female managers on the male-female wage gap.  
t δ i δ
ijt ε 1 γ
The model accounts for many of the possible factors that could affect both the share 
of female managers and the relative wages received by women. Establishment size takes 
into account that women tend to manage smaller establishments and the industry and 
sector dummies capture systematic sorting of workers into these domains, which in turn 
could produce a spurious correlation between female management and the gender wage 
gap. Finally, the year dummy variables account for secular changes in the male-female 
wage gap and the proportion of female managers.  
To control for unobserved time-varying differences between establishments, such as 
wage practices and organizational structure, I also include the proportion of female co-
workers. This could be a problem if female managers have a direct impact on the female 
composition of the establishment, in which case the inclusion of the female 
establishment share would produce an inconsistent estimate of  .  To assess the 
importance of this concern, I examine the relationship between female management and 
female hires in Section 5.2. I also test whether the estimates are sensitive to time-
invariant establishment heterogeneity by including establishment fixed effect in (1). 
1 γ
The worker fixed effects contained in  i δ  account for the fact that manager 
characteristics may affect the type of workers who want to join and leave the firm. The 
variation in exposure to female managers comes from workers switching jobs, as well 
as from changes in manager composition within a given job spell. This model thus 
addresses the main concern that the variation in the gender composition of managers is 
be correlated with unobserved differences in worker quality. For example, if the most 
talented women enter female-led establishments, either because they anticipate better 
career opportunities in female-led firms or because female managers have better 
                                                 
14 The individual characteristics are age, age
2, educational attainment (6 levels), experience and tenure divided into 
five categories (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10, and >10 years). The workplace characteristics are ln(workplace size), industry, 
sector and the proportion of female co-workers. 
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a negative effect of female management on the gender-wage gap.
15  
Table 3 reports the baseline results; the last column is the worker fixed effects model 
obtained from estimation of equation (1). The variable of interest is the interaction term 
between the gender dummy and the proportion of female managers reported in the first 
row. The proportion of female managers and co-workers are centered around their 
means throughout the table, and the individual observations are weighted according to 
their sampling probabilities. 
Column (1) shows the estimated gender wage gap and the association between the 
wage and the proportion of female managers when including standard Mincerian human 
capital controls (education, the age-earnings profile, experience and job tenure) and year 
effects. The estimates of the controls are not shown in the table, but these have the 
expected signs. The reported coefficients suggest that the adjusted gender wage gap is 
14 percent and that workers receive 8 percent lower wages in female-led establishments 
compared to male-led establishments.  
Column (2) allows the impact of having female managers to differ between male and 
female workers. The wage penalty of being employed in a women-led establishment is 
lower for female than for male employees, suggesting a negative correlation between 
the proportion of female managers and the gender wage gap. Column (3) further adds 
industry and establishment controls including the share of female co-workers, column 
(4) adds establishment fixed effects, column (5) adds establishment×(3-digit) 
occupation fixed effects whereas column (6) instead of the establishment fixed effects 
includes worker fixed effects.
16   
Both the gender wage gap and the wage penalty from being employed in a women-
led establishment diminish as more establishment attributes are controlled for, 
suggesting that part of these associations reflect that female employees and managers 
work in lower-paying industries and establishments. The estimates in column (3) 
                                                 
15 Female managers may also affect the composition of those who leave the firm. For example, using matched 
employer-employee data from Sweden for the period 1970-1990, Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom (2010) show that 
males are more likely to quit under female management in male-dominated occupations. In female-dominated 
occupations, men are indifferent. These effects are particularly strong among workers with a college education. 
16 I allow the impact of female co-workers to be different for women and men. 
16  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap suggest that men receive 4 percent lower and women receive 0.7 percent higher wages 
(4.7 versus 4.0) under female compared to male management. The relationship remains 
when establishment fixed effects are included in column (4), suggesting that 
unobservable workplace wage determinants common to both genders are not driving the 
relationship between female-led establishments and the gender wage gap.  
One potential reason for the lower wage-gap in female-led firms is that women work 
in relatively better jobs when working for female employers. I test this by including 
workplace×occupation fixed effects in column (5), which explains about half of the 
wage premium from having female managers.
17 However, even when comparing the 
wages of men and women who hold similar jobs for the same employer, there is still a 
three percent lower gender wage gap in female-led versus male-led establishments.
18 
The last column includes worker fixed effects. These estimates suggest that 
individual sorting is very important; accounting for individual heterogeneity reduces the 
estimates substantially; male workers receive 0.4 percent lower wages in female-led 
firms, whereas women receive 0.1 percent lower wages. Thus, the impact of female 
managers for a given worker is economically small (but still precisely estimated). The 
results from separate regressions for men and women lead to the same conclusions 
(Table A 1). 
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17 It should be noted that the inclusion of occupational controls implies that I may be over-controlling in the sense 
that job allocation is one of the mechanisms through which women could benefit from female managers. 
18 The 3-digit occupational code covers 113 different occupations that distinguish between, for example, college and 
primary teaching professionals or business and legal professionals. Meyersson et al. (2001) document an occupation-
establishment gender wage gap of one and five percent for blue-collar and white-collar workers, respectively, using a 
large sample of private sector employees in 1990. They use a more detailed occupational code, which is a possible 
explanation for the smaller wage gap in their study compared to that documented in column (5) of Table 3.  Table 3 Female managers and the gender wage gap 
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Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Share  female  co-workers  no  no yes yes yes yes 
Industry  dummies  no  no yes yes yes yes 
Establishment fixed effects  no  no  no  yes  yes  no 
Establishment × Occ. fixed effects  no  no  no  no  yes  no 
Worker  fixed  effects  no no no no no yes 
R
2  0.46 0.46 0.52 0.65 0.76 0.92 
Establishments  61,684 61,684 58,150 58,150 59,486 58,150 
Observations 23,232,506  23,232,506  22,275,484 22,275,484 22,329,637 22,275,484 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. 
Apart from the controls reported in the table, all regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10, and >10 years). 
Columns (3)-(6) include log(workplace size) and a variable indicating whether the individual works in the public sector. Column (3) includes industry dummies at the 5-digit level, while 
columns (4)-(6) replace the 5-digit industry dummies with dummies defined at the 2-digit level. The occupation dummies included in column (5) are defined at the 3-digit level. The 
observations are weighted according to their sampling probabilities. Table A 2 in the Appendix examines how sensitive the main results from Table 3, 
column (6) are to changes in the choice of the continuous measure of female managers 
and the use of sampling weights. First, I test whether a dichotomous measure of female 
leadership produces different results. I constructed a female-led dummy that takes the 
value of one if more than 50 percent of the highest-ranked managers are women and 
zero, otherwise. As we can see in Panel B, these results are very similar to those in 
Table 3, although somewhat less precisely estimated. This is not particularly surprising 
since most establishments are either managed by males or by females (Figure A 1, 
Appendix).
19 Unweighted regressions also produce very similar results (Panel C), 
suggesting that the underrepresentation of small establishments in the private sector is 
unlikely to affect the estimates to any large extent.  
5.2  Female managers and worker sorting 
The results in Table 3 contest that managers treat opposite sex workers differently once 
we control for their level of productivity. To further substantiate the importance of 
worker selection this section examines whether the gender and skill composition of 
hires varies with the gender composition of managers.  
The data for the analysis contain all newly hired workers during the period 1996-
2008; defined as those who did not receive compensation from their current employer in 
any of the five preceding years.
20 Inspired by Carlsson et al. (2011), the data are further 
linked to pre-determined measures of worker skills obtained using the regression 
framework developed by Abowd et al. (1999), which decomposes wages into individual 
and firm heterogeneity. In practice, I use data for the pre-sample period 1985-1995 and 
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   (2) 
 
19 The median number of managers is one, and thus, in most cases, the female share is either zero or one. 
20 Some additional restrictions are applied to the data. First, to focus attention on actual hires, I disregard workers 
earning below the 10
th percentile of the overall earnings distribution in order to avoid classifying loosely connected 
workers as new hires. Second, I also require that the establishment existed the year before the hire, and I remove 
establishments that changed more than two-thirds of the workforce from one year to the next. 
21 I estimate the person-effects using the a2reg.do code written by Amine Quazad. This program follows Abowd et al. 
(2002). 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  19 where  s a vector of individual specific indicators;   comp the establishment 
indicators;   captures th time effects; and   is the error term. The model also 
accounts for the age-earnings profile of the worker.  
 i rises 
e 
i θ (,) J it ψ
t ϕ ijt ε
The estimated person effect  ˆ
i θ  measures the part of the wage that does not vary as 
the employee moves from one establishment to another, thus reflecting the portable 
earnings capacity of workers. The  ˆ
i θ ´s may include both observable characteristics such 
as education and experience as well as unobservable traits, such as innate ability or 
motivation. For simplicity I refer to these estimates as worker “skills”.
22 The main 
advantage of using pre-period data is that this reassures that the skill measures are 
exogenous to the gender composition of managers at the time of hire.
23 Moreover, as 
skills are measured in terms of wages, it is easy to relate the effects of female 
management on the skill composition of hires to the portion of the gender wage gap 
explained by the worker fixed effects in the main analysis.
24   
Figure A 2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of worker skills, measured by  ˆ θ , 
among newly hired workers during 1996-2008, broken down by gender. There is a wide 
variation in the person effects, suggesting that workers differ substantially in their 
permanent skills. The skill distributions are, moreover, different in the sample of hired 
men and women; the estimated person effects are higher on average and display less 
variation for male workers compared to female workers.
25 
                                                 
22 Note that worker’s observed human capital will be included in the second stage hiring equation (eq. 3). 
23 A drawback is that the early period lacks information on actual wages. Thus, instead of having wages as the 
dependent variable in eq. (2), I use monthly full-time earnings. These are calculated as worker’s annual earnings 
divided by months of employment, including only employment spells that cover November each year. In order to 
focus on full-time or close to full-time earnings, I use a minimum wage cut-off of 75 percent of the mean wage of 
janitors. In addition, I retain worker’s main source of income. Other studies have used this approximated wage 
measure and shown that the earnings distribution resembles the true wage distribution (Nordström Skans et al., 2009 
and Carlsson et al., 2011). To be sure, I also checked the correlation between the person effects derived from monthly 
earnings and wages in the later period (see Table A3 in Appendix). The correlation is high (88 percent), suggesting 
that using monthly full time earnings instead of true wages is not likely to be an issue of large concern for this 
analysis. 
24 This is also highlighted by Carlsson et al., (2011), who use a similar strategy to examine the importance of worker 
selection in explaining the relationship between firm-level productivity and individual wages. 
25 Both of these may (partly) reflect differences and variations in hours worked. 
20  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap Table 4 examines the association between the gender composition of managers and 
the skill composition of new hires. For comparability, the empirical approach is 
identical to that used when analyzing wages. Thus, the model is: 
 
11 2 ˆHM M
ijt i i ijt ijt ijt t ijt FF S SX θ βγ γ δ ε =+ × + + + +  (3) 
where  ˆH
ijt θ  is the estimated skill component obtained from eq. (2) for worker i hired by 
establishment j in year t;  ijt F is a dummy that takes the value of one if the individual is 
female; 
M
ijt S is the proportion of female managers; and Xijt includes worker i:s observable 
human capital (age and education). The variable of interest is  , which measures 
whether female-led establishments recruit female workers with higher permanent skills 
relative to males compared to male-led establishments. 
1 γ
The estimates in Table 4 suggest that this is indeed the case; there is a positive and 
statistically significant impact of female managers on the skill level of newly hired 
women.
26 The estimate does not change much throughout columns (1)-(4), suggesting 
that unobserved heterogeneity at the industry-, establishment- or job level does not 
explain these productivity-related gender differences in recruitments. Interestingly, the 
magnitudes are similar to the portion of the association between female management 
and the gender wage gap explained by the worker fixed effects in the main analysis 
presented in Table 3. This confirms that most of this relationship is explained by 
compositional effects, which moreover seem to arise through differential hiring rather 
than employee turnover.
27  
5.3  Female managers or female-friendly firms? 
The establishment fixed effects in column (3) account for workplace factors that are 
common to workers of both sexes employed in the establishment. Hence, it could still 
                                                 
26 We learn from looking at the female dummy that there is a substantial difference in the average skill level between 
hired men and women. Although I disregard monthly earnings below a minimum wage in order to resemble the true 
wage distribution when estimating the person effects in the pre-period, the distribution of the approximated wage 
measure displays higher variation than true wages, which probably reflects differences in hours. The magnitude of the 
gender difference should thus be interpreted with caution, as it may indicate systematic gender differences in hours 
worked in the pre-period. 
27 Using the unweighted sample also yields similar results. 
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unobserved firm practices rather than female management per se. For example, earlier 
literature has pointed out that women have a higher demand for firm practices that help 
to balance work and career (Bloom et al, 2010). Hence, differences in the provision of 
family friendly practices may generate systematic sorting of female talent across 
employers.
28 
To separate between these explanations, which is crucial for the interpretation of the 
results, the last column includes gender-specific establishment dummies. Identification 
of the impact of female managers now comes from within establishment variation in 
female management over time. As displayed in column (5) this reduces the estimates 
significantly, suggesting that unobserved workplace practices is the main driver behind 
the relationship between female management and the sorting of women across 
establishments. 
In the lower panel of Table 4, I also look at the relationship between the gender 
composition of managers and the proportion of female hires. This relationship is 
interesting in itself and it is also informative regarding the validity of the main empirical 
strategy, which uses co-worker composition to proxy for unobserved differences at the 
establishment level. The results are obtained from estimating linear probability models, 
where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the hire is female and zero, 
otherwise. The explanatory variable of interest is the proportion of female managers. 
The rest of the controls included are those indicated by the table.  
As seen in the table, there is a substantial raw correlation between the female 
composition of managers and hires, but only a small part of this effect remains when 
industry and establishment characteristics are taken into account. Evaluated at the 
average female share of hires (54 percent), the estimates suggest that gender-biased 
recruitments are of minor importance in this context.
29 
                                                 
28 The provision of female practices may be one margin for firms to compete for the most talented women. 
Alternatively, and as argued by Bloom et al (2010) there is a social value attached to the provision of family-friendly 
practices, which enter into the choice of different firm strategies. 
29 Using similar models, Aslund et al., (2009) documents that immigrant managers are three times as likely to hire 
immigrants compared to native managers. In comparison to those findings, the impact of female managers is small. 
This also implies that the potential bias in the main results is likely to be small, since workplace gender composition 
is only mildly affected by the share of female managers. 
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A: Dep. var.: Person effect         































2 0.802  0.809  0.824  0.852  0.831 
Observations 1,500,109  1,483,766 1,453,064  1,453,064 1,453,064 
B: Dep. var.: Hire is female       










2  0.108 0.238  0.301  0.404   
Observations 2,902,637  2,893,096 2,815,111  2,815,111   
Year  dummies  yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Education dummies (observable 
general human capital) 
yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Industry  dummies    no  yes yes  yes yes 
Establishment fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
Establishment × occupation  
(3-digit) fixed effects 
no no  no  yes  yes 
Establishment × female fixed 
effects 
no no  no  no  yes 
Notes: . *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 
robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of newly hired workers 
during 1996-2008. The dependent variable in the first panel is the estimated worker fixed effects obtained from the 
estimation of eq. (2). The dependent variable in the second panel is a dummy that takes the value of one if the hire is 
female and zero, otherwise. The proportion of female managers is mean-centered. Apart from the controls reported in 
the table, all regressions control for age and age
2. Columns (2)-(4) include log(establishment size) and a variable 
indicating whether the individual works in the public sector. Column (2) includes industry dummies at the 5-digit 
level, while columns (3) and (4) replace the 5-digit industry dummies with dummies defined at the 2-digit level. The 
observations are weighted according to the sampling probabilities. 
5.4 Heterogeneity  analysis 
Despite the small effects found in Table 3, it is not possible to rule out that some women 
may still benefit from having female managers. To examine this in further detail, I look 
at the impact of female managers in various subsamples. This section provides a 
summary of these results, which are presented in Table A4-Table A 6 in the Appendix. 
For simplicity, I estimate separate regressions for women and men, but I also discuss the 
implications of the estimates for the gender wage gap.  
I start out with the differential impact of female managers with respect to sector and 
establishment size. One potential explanation for the small effects found earlier is that 
female managers are more concentrated to the public sector, where government 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  23 objectives and policies against discrimination may limit the scope for discrimination in 
the first place.
30 Columns 1 and 2 in Table A4 display the results from separate estima-
tions of model (1) for public and private employees. I find no evidence that women-led 
firms are more important in the private sector compared to the public sector. If anything, 
women receive lower wages in female-led private establishments (Panel A), but this is 
also true for male workers (Panel B). Hence, there is no association between the 
proportion of female managers and the gender wage gap in the private sector.  I also test 
whether the impact differs with establishment size, but I reject that managers have a 
significantly differential impact in small (column 3) and large (column 4) establish-
ments.  
Finally, I examine whether there is a difference in the impact of female managers in 
female dominated versus male dominated establishments by allowing the effect of 
female managers to vary with the sex composition of the co-workers. The results, 
reported in columns (5)-(7) suggest that there is a small wage premium for women 
employed in a female-led, female-dense establishment compared to women employed in 
female-dense male-led organizations (column 5). There are at least two possible 
mechanisms that could motivate this finding. First, a higher proportion of women may 
reflect that the establishment is female-friendly, with female managers, a more women 
dense workforce and higher female wages. Second, women managers may have better 
information about women’s productivity in the hiring stage, for example, if they interact 
more closely with their female employees or use them as referrals.
31   
Columns (6) and (7) show results from separate regressions for workers entering an 
establishment and for those with at least one year of job tenure. The female wage 
premium of being hired by a woman manager is concentrated at the beginning of the 
employment spell. This lends suggestive support to the notion that female managers in 
                                                 
30 Although the public sector in Sweden is decentralized and wages to a large extent are determined through 
individual wage bargaining, wages are less dispersed in the public sector than in the private sector.  
31 Hires mediated by referrals reduce employer uncertainty about worker productivity both by transmitting 
information to the prospective employee about the employer and by informing the employer about potential 
employees (Montgomery, 1991). Dustmann et al. (2010) develop a model where networks improve the ability of 
employers to recognize workers with the highest match-specific productivity whereby hires found through referrals 
receive an entry wage premium that diminishes with tenure. If female managers are more likely to use other women 
as referrals, this could lead to an entry wage premium that increases with the number of potential referrals (i.e., 
women) and that diminishes as employers learn about the true productivity of workers. 
24  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap women-dense establishments may have an information advantage in the hiring stage, 
which diminishes as employers learn about the true productivity of workers. 
So far, I have only concentrated on the highest ranked managers in the establish-
ments under study. This could misleading if workers are influenced by managers with 
whom they closely interact. For example, if managers are important as mentors or role 
models, then being exposed to women at lower managerial levels may be equally – or 
even more – important than being employed in a firm with a female executive. To 
examine this, I use a sample of establishments with multiple manager levels and allow 
for a separate impact from middle and top managers.
32 The importance of middle 
managers is particularly interesting because this group contains a larger fraction of 
women than the group of top managers.  
The results, displayed in Table A 5, show that there is no significant impact of either 
top or middle managers on female wages. However, there is a negative and significant 
interaction effect between the impact of female middle managers and wages (column 2), 
though only for tenured workers (column 4). This indicates that being exposed to 
middle managers on the job seems to increase women’s wages when women are in the 
minority in their establishment. The fact that managers only matter when the woman-to-
female-manager ratio is low may suggest that there might be a cost attached to helping 
other women advance.
33 
To illustrate this further, I also estimated models similar to model (1), allowing both 
the baseline effect of managers as well as the interaction between managers and entry-
level co-workers to vary with job tenure according to five categories (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10, 
and >10 years). The results for women are plotted in Figure 3. For estimates and 
standard errors, see Table A 6 in the Appendix. 
Although the precision of the estimates is poor, they clearly support the hypothesis 
that women with a high share of female middle managers have higher wage growth if 
they are in the minority in their establishment. However, while women seem to benefit 
                                                 
32 Twenty-six percent of the workers are exposed both to top and middle managers.  
33 This finding is consistent with Hultin and Szulkin (2003), who show that the proportion of males at lower decision-
making hierarchical levels (i.e., supervisors) has a larger impact on the gender-wage gap than male representation at 
higher levels (i.e., managers), and it is also consistent with Cardoso and Winter Ebmer (2010), who show that the 
wage premium from having lower-level female managers decreases with the share of females in the firm. 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  25 from a low female-to-manager ratio, male workers lose out and receive a relatively 
lower wage growth compared to male workers in male-led firms (Figure A 3 and Figure 
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Figure 3 Female wage premium of female middle management by tenure and co–
worker composition 
Notes: The black circles show the estimated effect of having female middle managers for women without any female 
co-workers. The hollow circles show the estimated effects for women with 50 percent female co-workers. For full 
results and standard errors, see Table A4 in the Appendix. 
6 Conclusions 
The underrepresentation of women in management positions is often highlighted as one 
explanation for the observed gender inequality in the labor market. A theoretical 
literature has also argued that female managers may break the glass ceiling for female 
employees, e.g., by serving as mentors and role models for lower-level employees or by 
eliminating discriminatory behavior. However, the existing empirical evidence provides 
scarce evidence on the relevance of gender biased wage setting and promotion practices 
and has not been able to separate such effects from alternative explanations.  
This paper has examined whether gender bias in the worker-manager relationship is 
an important determinant of wages using Swedish longitudinal matched employer-
employee data covering 13 years. I document that the gender wage gap among non-
managerial workers decreased by one percentage point during this period, while the 
26  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap share of female managers increased by more than ten percentage points. In addition, I 
find a negative correlation between the proportion of female managers and the within-
establishment gender wage gap, which is both economically and statistically relevant. 
The magnitude of this effect is in line with previous work; Carduso and Winter-Ebmer 
(2010) document a similar association in Portugal. 
However, once I control for gender-related productivity differences I find that most 
of the association between female managers and the gender wage gap goes away. The 
remaining effects imply a 0.3 percent narrowing of the gender wage gap in female-led 
versus male-led establishments. The effects do not seem to vary with establishment size 
or sector.  
The results indirectly suggest that the presence of female leadership is positively 
related to the skill composition of women. Looking further at the characteristics of 
newly hired workers I find that these compositional effects are determined by 
unobserved workplace characteristics rather than differing hiring strategies of male and 
female managers. I cannot separate whether this is mainly due to behavior on the 
demand or supply side of the labor market. In other words, female talent may either 
enter some firms because they anticipate better career opportunities or because some 
firms are better in finding high-wage women.  
In any case, my results contradict the notion that female managers are more female-
friendly in the selection of and wages paid to workers. Women do seem to benefit from 
having more female managers in middle management positions, but this positive impact 
diminishes as the share of female co-workers increase. Together, these results suggest 
that female supervisors might protect or mentor other women in male-dominated work 
environments, but the role of female managers can be overstated if we do not 
sufficiently account for the selection of workers into male- versus female-led 
establishments.  
My findings are also interesting since they indicate that differences in workplace 
practices may influence the selection of women into establishments, which can in turn 
lead to a path-dependence in the supply and representation of female managers in some 
organizations. A deeper assessment of the factors determining the selection of appointed 
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  27 and potential leadership female candidates thus seems important in order to fully 
understand the determinants of women’s wages and careers. 
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Figure A 1 Distribution of female co-workers and highest ranked female managers for 
female (upper) and male (lower) employees 
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2 0.91  0.92 
Establishments 55,288  52,385 
Observations 11,263,781  11,011,703 
Year dummies  yes  yes 
Industry dummies  yes  yes 
Worker fixed effects  yes  yes 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively. Standard errors robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. 
The table provides results from separate regressions of model (1) on samples of non-manager male and female 
employees. All regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies 
(0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10 and >10 years), log(workplace size) and a public sector dummy. 
 
 
Table A 2 Sensitivity of the main results 
Variable of interest:  Female managers × Female Female  Managers 












Notes: Each panel (row) represents a separate regression. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in 
parentheses. All regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies 
(0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10 and >10 years), log(workplace size), a public sector dummy and year effects. They also include 
industry (2-digit) and worker fixed effects. 
 
  
IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  35 Table A 3 Correlation between estimated person effects from monthly wages and 
monthly earnings 
  Person effects 
monthly wages 
Person effects 
monthly full time earnings 
Person effects  
monthly wages 
1  
Person effects  
monthly full time earnings 
0.88 1 
Notes: The table shows the correlation between the estimated person effects using monthly full-time earnings and 
























Figure A 2 Distribution of hires permanent skills 
Notes: This figure shows a kernel density estimate of the person effects obtained from equation (2) in 
Section 5.1 I use an Epanechnikov kernel and “optimal” bandwidth. The sample consists of new hires 
during 1996-2008 
.
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Table A4 Effect of female managers on wages: subsamples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Females 
























Female managers × female  co-workers     
 







2  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.92 
Establishments  34,977 25,526 52,295  6,120  55,288 46,569 53,183 
Observations  7,815,406 3,448,375 5,715,810 5,517,327  11,263,781  1,815,254 9,448,527 
Panel B: Males         





















2  0.94 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.93 
Establishments  32,551 24,977 49,380  6,120  52,385 43,790 49,304 
Observations  5,036,324 5,975,379 5,160,882 5,826,623  11,011,703  1,543,324 9,468,379 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  dummies    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Worker  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. 
All regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies (0, 1-2, 3-4, 5-10 and >10 years), log(workplace size) and a dummy indicating 
whether the individual works in an establishment in the public sector. The industry dummies are defined at the 2-digit level. All variables shown in the table are mean-centered. Table A 5 Impact of female managers on female wages (top and middle managers) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























Manager–co-worker interactions:     
















Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry dummies (2-digit)  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Worker fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R
2 0.93  0.93  0.95  0.94§ 
Establishments 13,404  13,404  11,441  13,302 
Observations 3,529,925  3,529,925 533,321 2,996,604 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 
robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. Apart from the controls reported in the table, 
all regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies (0, 1-2, 3-4, 
5-10, and >10 years), log(workplace size) and a dummy indicating whether the individual works in an establishment 
in the public sector. All variables shares shown in the table are mean-centered. 
  
38  IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap 
 IFAU – Manager Impartiality? Worker-firm matching and the gender wage gap  39 
Table A 6 Effect of female managers, manager type and tenure interactions 
 (1)  (2) 
Sample: Females  Males 
 Estimate  se  Estimate  se 
Female middle managers × tenure       
0 -0.004  0.009  -0.001  0.011 
1-2 0.006  0.009  -0.014  0.009 
3-4 0.017  0.012  -0.020*  0.012 
5-10 0.022*  0.013  -0.008  0.016 
>10 0.027*  0.016  -0.008  0.017 
Manager-co-worker interactions: Female middle × female co-workers × tenure 
0 0.014  0.013  0.025  0.018 
1-2 -0.010*  0.011  0.036**  0.014 
3-4 -0.030**  0.016  0.043**  0.014 
5 -0.037**  0.018  0.015  0.026 
>10  -0.054 0.21 -0.010  0.028 
Female top managers × tenure       
0 -0.011  0.011  -0.010  0.011 
1-2 -0.002  0.007  -0.001  0.007 
3-4 -0.007  0.009  0.001  0.010 
5 0.001  0.010  -0.008  0.013 
>10 0.020  0.013  -0.007  0.019 
Manager-co-worker interactions: Female top × female co-workers × tenure 
0 0.016  0.014  0.022  0.014 
1-2 -0.0004  0.009  -0.013  0.012 
3-4 0.001  0.013  -0.030*  0.016 
5 -0.010  0.014  -0.038*  0.020 
>10 -0.037**  0.017  -0.005  0.030 
R
2 0.93  -  0.94  - 
Observations 3,529,925  -  4,693,533  - 
Establishments 13,404  -  13,424  - 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Worker dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 
robust for clustering at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. Apart from the controls reported in the table, 
all regressions control for age, age
2, education dummies (6 categories), experience and tenure dummies (0, 1-2, 3-4, 
5-10, and >10 years), log(workplace size) and a dummy indicating whether the individual works in an establishment 











































Figure A 3 Impact of female middle managers on male and female wages for 

















































Figure A 4 Impact of female middle managers on male and female wages for 
employees with 50 percent female co-workers 
Notes: The estimates are obtained from separate regressions of female managers on wages for males and females. For 
full results and standard errors, see Table A 6. 
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